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Résumé: Une formalisation du Principe de Précaution est donnée ici : nous formalisons
la connaissance scientifique relative à la plausibilité d'évènements dans
l'espace des états, ainsi que les concepts d'évènements et d'actes
scientifiquements non ambigus. Nous définissons un plannificateur non
précautionneux comme maximisant une utilité espérée de Savage après avoir
écarté les actes scientifiquement ambigus. Nous montrons que pour une classe
étendue de préférences de l'agent représentatif dans cette économie, cette
modalité de choix non précautionneuse est sous-optimale. Nous confrontons
cette modélisation à des débats, nationaux ou internationaux, concernant le
changement climatique, certains arbitrages à l'OMC, et la régulation en
matière de sécurité des produits chimiques.
Abstract: A formalization of the Precautionary Principle is given here : We formalize
scientific knowledge on the likelihood of events in the state space and the
concepts of scientifically unambiguous events and acts. We give a definition
of a non-precautionary social planner as a Savage Expected Utility maximizer
who evaluates acts relative to a baseline, called "business as usual", and who
disregards scientifically ambiguous acts, and we show that, for a wide class of
preferences for the representative agent, non-precautionary decision making is
sub-optimal. A discussion of this formalization is given in the context of
national and international debates on Precautions, in the fields of Climate
Change, of WTO arbitrages, and of the safety regulations of chemical
products.
Mots clés : Ambiguité, évènements objectivement non ambigus, précaution.
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1 Introduction
The origins of the Precautionary Principle can be traced back to the German
Vorsorgeprinzip introducing a distinction between human activity with \dan-
gers" of catastrophic consequences (nuclear apocalypse was then high on the
list) and which must be prevented at all costs (Gefahrenvorsorge) and human
activity with potentially harmful consequences (Risikovorsorge), in which case
preventive measures should be investigated and taken in case of suciently high
risk of sucient harm.
This principle implied a reversal of the burden of proof from the propo-
nents of the hypothesis of a causal link between a particular activity and harm-
ful eects, to the promoters of the said activity (from the Cassandras to the
Agamemnons as it were).
Some hold the extreme view that this reversal of the burden of proof must
be taken to mean that before engaging in (or indeed maintaining) an economic
activity, proof must be supplied of its harmlessness. At the level of political
decision making, such a view rests on an ill dened set of possible acts (in the
case of Climate Change, for instance, the decision not to invest in renewable
energy sources is an act which does not correspond to an economic activity as
intended above) and is excessive in requesting a full reversal of the burden of
proof. However, the (concept of) reversal of the burden of proof was clearly
at the heart of that prevention principle through the relation between scientic
knowledge and investment.
The formulations evolved in the international arena through a series of con-
ferences on the protection of the North Sea At Bremen (1984) it was concluded
that \damage to the environment can be irreversible, or remediable only at a
considerable cost and over long periods of time, and that, therefore, coastal
states and the EEC must not wait for proof of harmful eect for taking action."
At the second conference in London (1987), the term `precautionary approach'
appeared as a decision approach that may require action to control inputs of the
\most harmful substances (...) even before a causal link has been established by
absolutely clear scientic evidence." By 1990 at the Hague, this same approach
was referred to as the \Precautionary Principle."
Its main avatar appeared in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, where a central topic was
the potential causal link between the burning of fossil fuels and the \greenhouse
eect."
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration issued at that conference is a compromise
between the Hague formulation of the precautionary principle and the US view
that the lack of clear scientic evidence for a causal relationship between human
behaviour and the greenhouse eect meant that taking expensive measures was
not acceptable. As a result, there is no question of \principle," but of mere
\approach," and the scope of the declaration is limited to damage which is
either \serious" or \irreversible" and the measures are to be \cost-eective
2
."
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Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: \In order to protect the environment, the precaution-
ary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there
2
Partly because of the insistence on cost-eectiveness of preventive measures
and on the issue of irreversibility, the principle was given an interpretation,
within a framework suited to the debate on Climate Change, by Gollier, Jul-
lien, and Treich (2000), purely in terms of traditional cost-benet analysis un-
der risk, thereby avoiding reference to the Knightian distinction
3
between risk
(where a single additive probability measure represents the likelihood of all rel-
evant events on the state space) and uncertainty -or ambiguity, as we shall call
it throughout- (in all other cases). Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000) iden-
tify a \precautionary eect," which, along with the \irreversibilibility eect" of
Arrow and Fischer (1974) and Henry (1974), refers to a lower optimal level of
investment (in activities that are harmful to the environment) when the decision
maker anticipates a (partial) \resolution of uncertainty" concerning the costs
and benets of the investment.
4
Both eects concern optimal behaviour under risk in the Savage Expected
Utility framework and both rely crucially on a dynamic framework and the
resolution of uncertainty (i.e. the conditioning on realized events or the outcome
of exogenous experiments). Although it is clear, on the one hand, that the
notion of irreversibility is tied to the dynamic framework, when dened as the
contraction of the set of possible acts at a future period, precaution and the
precautionary principle, on the other hand, can be given a formulation in a
static framework without prejudging of its dynamic extensions.
Moreover, it appears that the crucial concept underlying the principle is not
the \resolution of uncertainty" but \uncertainty" itself, clearly referred to in
the historic formulations as a departure from \sucient scientic knowledge" or
\conclusive scientic evidence" and therefore inconsistent with a representation
of beliefs as a single additive probability measure on the relevant events in the
state space.
The precautionary principle is therefore tied to an assumption of epistemo-
logical indeterminacy, especially in TimothyO'Riordan's denition (in O'Riordan
and Jordan (1995) for example) which we adopt here as a reference: \the prin-
ciple of precaution in environmental management implies committing human
activity to investments where the benets of action cannot, at the time of ex-
penditure, be justied by conclusive scientic evidence."
The notions of \cost-eectiveness" (Rio Declaration) and \justied expendi-
ture" (O'Riordan Denition) can be taken to mean optimal in a Savage Expected
Maximization framework, and we therefore formalize epistemological indetermi-
nacy (situation in which \expenditure cannot be justied") as the lack of a class
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientic certainty shall not be used
a reason for postponing cost-eective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
3
A similar distinction appears in Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921).
4
There may be a countervailing \wealth eect" due to the possibility of making more ac-
curate decisions on the basis of better information. This eect was rst recognized by Epstein
(1980), and is evaluated with respect to the precautionary and irreversibility eects in Gollier,
Jullien, and Treich (2000). On the relative magnitude of these eects, see Chichilnisky and
Heal (1993) and Ulph and Ulph (1997). On irreversibility in the dynamics of investment, see
also Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Godard (2001) discusses the relationship
between the Precautionary Principle and the results in Gollier, Jullien, and Treich (2000).
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of relevant events on the state space, together with a single additive probability
measure on those events, which accurately summarize scientic knowledge
5
.
We place ourselves in the Savage decision framework where 
 is the state
space, or set of elementary events, H is the space of consequences, and  is a
family of possible actions (Savage acts) which map 
 intoH. We are considering
a social planner, with set of possible acts , who is maximizing the utility of
a representative agent with preference relation over acts denoted by , and we
suppose that utility of outcomes and beliefs on the likelihood of events (subsets
of 
) are biseparable in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) (so that,
in particular preferences are state independent). Outcome sensitivity is repre-
sented by a utility function on H and beliefs over the likelihood of events are
represented by a set function on events. Savage expected utility provides such
a separation, in which  is fully represented by the expectation of the utility of
acts taken with respect to a single subjective probability measure over events.
Such a separation is a crucial assumption since we identify the agent's beliefs
over the likelihood of events with the social planner's, the latter being derived
from \scientic knowledge." Whether this implies perfect extraction of subjec-
tive beliefs of agents by the planner, or that agents are perfectly informed of
objective scientic knowledge, or a combination of both, is irrelevant in the for-
malization of the decision making principle we attempt. However, in the context
of environmental preservation, the objective interpretation is the more attrac-
tive one. One may think, say, of the conclusions of the IPCC 2001 Report
6
as
summarized by the knowledge of the relevant class of subsets of 
 (\scientically
determined events") and of a set function operating on this class. Because most
of the physical models used in the report's predictions are deterministic and the
uncertainty is introduced through dierent calibrations of relevant parameters,
there is no reason to assume that the ranges of likelihood between upper and
lower probabilities are degenerate, i.e. that beliefs can be accurately described
by an additive measure on events.
However, from the scientic information suitably summarized by a non addi-
tive set function, one can dene a subclass of events A on which the set function
characterizing likelihood is indeed additive. This subclass will be called the class
of scientically unambiguous events (which may be empty), and acts which op-
erate only on unambiguous events (i.e. are measurable with respect to A) will
be termed unambiguous acts. 
ua
will denote the subfamily of unambiguous
acts which have a simple interpretation as the acts the consequences of which
there is \sucient scientic knowledge" to evaluate in a traditional cost-benet
analysis under risk: in other words, such that the restriction of  to 
ua
can
be realistically represented by Savage Expected Utility.
We see now that the formulations of the Precautionary Principle in interna-
tional arenas yield a natural formalization of non-precautionary decision making
5
To x ideas, it is useful to take the philosophical stance that the system is ontologicallyde-
terminate, meaning that all events occur according to a single -unknown- probability measure
on the state space endowed with its power set.
6
Any one of the series of three reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change.
4
in this framework, namely maximization of expected utility on the set of acts
which are scientically unambiguous according to our denition. A simple for-
mulation of the Precautionary Principle then becomes: \in all decision settings,
non-precautionary decision making is sub optimal."
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; the next section introduces
the model of scientic knowledge on the state space and the denition of sci-
entically unambiguous acts, and presents the main formalization of the Pre-
cautionary Principle as Theorem 1. Section 3 shows the equivalence between
scientically unambiguous acts as dened here and subjectively unambiguous
acts as dened by Epstein and Zhang (2001) in a large class of state-independent
preference relations for the representative agents. Section 4 discusses the for-
malization in the context of controversies on the Principle. Section 5 concludes.
2 Precautionary Principle
We begin this section with an objective denition of scientic knowledge and
its induced beliefs over the state space, general enough to avoid precluding a
subjective interpretation of the latter. We model scientic knowledge over the
state space as a family of onto mappings from a standard Borel set Y ([0; 1] for
instance), into 
.
Scientic Knowledge: F = ff 2 F : Y ! 
; ontog:
This can be interpreted as the result of experimentation carried within the
framework of a set of \scientic theories," and a special case of F is the family of
measurable selections of a random correspondence F : Y ! P(
) (see Castaldo
and Marinacci (2001) for details). As in Amarante (2001), we dene the induced
representation of beliefs on 
 as the push-forward of the usual exterior measure
on Y , denoted 

: for each f in F , we dene an induced set function 

f
on all
subsets of 
 as


f
(A) = 

(f
 1
(A)); all A 2 P(
); (1)
and we call 
f
the largest -algebra on which 

f
is a probability measure, and
nally we denote by P
f
the restriction of 

f
to 
f
. Therefore, for each f , we
dene a probability space (
;
f
; P
f
), and if we consider the measurable space
(
;
F
), where 
F
is the largest -algebra contained in \
f2F

f
, fP
f
; f 2 Fg
can be interpreted as a set of priors on the scientically determined class of
relevant events. If 
F
= f;
g, we call the scientic knowledge F irrelevant
to the state space.
Finally, we summarize the belief representation on 
 with the denition of


F
such that, for all A 2 P(
),


F
(A) = inf
f2F


f
(A): (2)
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We immediately see that 

F
is a non additive probability on P(
) satisfying


F
() = 0; 

F
(
) = 1; (3)
A  B =) 

F
(A)  

F
(B): (4)
Call 
F
the restriction of 

F
to 
F
. By construction, 
F
is the lower envelope
7
of the set of priors fP
f
; f 2 Fg, and therefore fP
f
; f 2 Fg  Core(
F
), where
the core of the non additive probability 
F
, denoted Core(
F
), is the set of
probability measures on (
;
F
) which dominate 
F
setwise:
Core(
F
) = fp 2M; p(A)  
F
(A); all A 2 
F
g (5)
whereM is the set of all countably additive probability measures on (
;
F
). In
the special case mentioned above, where F is dened as the family of measurable
selections of a random correspondence F , 
F
is actually the belief function
8
induced on 
 by F as dened in Dempster (1967) (i.e. for allA 2 P(
), 
F
(A) =


(F
 1
(A))). In addition, as shown by Castaldo and Marinacci (2001), when

 is a Polish space (complete, separable and metrizable topological space), and
F is compact valued, the core of 
F
is equal to the weak

-closed convex hull of
fP
f
; f 2 Fg.
To formalize the idea of epistemological indeterminacy as a departure from a
single additive probability on relevant events, we call \scientically unambigu-
ous" all the events on which 
F
and all the measures in fP
f
; f 2 Fg coincide
9
.
We call A the class of scientically unambiguous events and we observe the
following properties of A, proved in Amarante (2001):
Lemma 1: A is a -system (i.e. stable with respect to complementation
and countable disjoint union), it contains all the 
F
-null events, and for all
A 2 A, 
F
(A
c
) = 1  
F
(A).
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is that all measures in the Core also
coincide on A.
It is important to note that A is not necessary closed with respect to nite
intersections. To illustrate the denitions above, consider a state space with
four states of nature 
 = fC;B;G;Wg, where elementary states C, G, B and
W stand for Catastrophic, Good, Bad and Windfall respectively. Consider
scientic knowledge over states as described by F = ff; gg on Y = [0; 1],
7
The fact that the set function representing beliefs is a lower probability by construction
does not constitute a restriction from a subjective point of view, as shown in Jaray and
Philippe (2001). The restriction to lower envelopes, on the other hand, can be improved
upon, in particular by considering events outside 
F
.
8
An objective interpretation of belief functions is sketched in Henry (2001). Note that
here, \belief function" is a well dened object and should not be confused with \beliefs" used
above as a general term for the agent's representation of the likelihood of events in the state
space.
9
This is by no means a new denition (see Epstein and Zhang (2001) and references
therein). It is the most natural denition of unambiguous events in our objective framework.
6
C s 2 [0; 0:01) C s 2 [0; 0:05)
f(s) = B s 2 [0:01; 0:5) g(s)= B s 2 [0:05; 0:5)
G s 2 [0:5; 0:95) G s 2 [0:5; 0:99)
W s 2 [0:95; 1] W s 2 [0:99; 1].
This is a summary of the interval-valued probability statements of the form \the
probability of windfall gains ranges between one and ve percent." Notice that,
in this setting, 
f
= 
g
= 
F
= P(
), and the set of scientically unambiguous
events,
A = f; fC;Bg; fB;Gg; fG;Wg; fC;Wgg;
is not closed with respect to nite intersection (fC;Bg \ fB;Gg = fBg is
ambiguous)
10
.
Returning to the general setting, we dene the set of scientically unam-
biguous acts, denoted 
ua
, as the set of acts which are measurable with respect
to A, i.e.

ua
= f 2 ; 
 1
(X) 2 A; all X 2 P(H)g:
They are the acts which operate only on unambiguous events. In terms of the
historic formulations of he Precautionary Principle, they are the investments
which can be \justied by conclusive scientic evidence."
In the example above, consider two acts I and T , so that  = fI; Tg, dened
by the following table of outcomes (or pay-os):
C B G W
I -110 -10 +10 +110
T -20 -20 +11 +11
We see that 
ua
= fTg because I, which we call \investment without insur-
ance," is an ambiguous act, as I
 1
(f 10g) = fBg, say, is an ambiguous event;
whereas T , or \trading of uncertainty on the basis of the minimum belief in the
windfall outcome and the maximumplausibility of the catastrophic outcome," is
an unambiguous act, because T
 1
(f 20g) = fC;Bg and T
 1
(f 11g) = fG;Wg
are both unambiguous events.
In such a simplied portfolio example, it would seem that of the two possi-
ble acts, the one that is intuitively \precautionary" in the sense that it hedges
uncertainty, is also -and naturally so- the unambiguous act: indeed naturally
so, since we have constructed our T act in order to remove Knightian uncer-
tainty (assuming arbitrarily that it was feasible). So it appears that the decision
maker is confronted with a static portfolio choice with two available acts, a sci-
entically ambiguous investment, the \intuitively non-precautionary" act, and
10
This is a slight variant from the numerical example in Amarante (2001).
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a scientically unambiguous investment with hedged Knightian uncertainty, the
intuitively \Precautionary" act.
It should be noted at this point, however, that we have not considered in-
vestment in a riskless asset or any kind of baseline act relative to which other
acts would be considered. Now social planning does not occur in a void, and can
be more easily apprehended in a static framework, with reference to a baseline
act which can be rationalized as the path of least political eort, and which we
will call \business as usual."
Consider the example of a local authority confronted with uncertain scientic
information on the health hazards of a construction material in a school build-
ing. The baseline act, in the absence of opinion pressure mechanisms creating
opposite incentives, would naturally be to disregard the information and avoid
spending public money with uncertain rewards. In the case of the diusion of
genetically modied crops, the baseline act from the point of view of the social
planner is naturally to avoid interfering through restrictive regulation in the
agricultural development process. If introducing a genetically modied strand
of a crop unambiguously increases yield, the decision to halt through regulations
it is considered as an alternative to non intervention, with unambiguous costs
and ambiguous rewards.
The case of Climate Change can be apprehended in a similar way, and we
shall consider a stylized representation of the problem. The state of the indus-
try and the state of the technology are paramount in the identication of the
baseline act. If we consider the regulation of electricity production with respect
to carbon dioxide (hereafter CO
2
) emissions in a country which produces all its
electricity in coal plants, the state of the industry is then dened by all-coal
generation of electricity. Suppose further that the state of the technology is
dened by the availability of an alternative generation method using natural
gas and producing less CO
2
emissions. Finally, CO
2
free generation methods
are considered, but more costly research is needed to develop them and to nd
out whether or not they are economically viable. So the acts available to the
planner are the following: The social planner may keep producing energy with
coal plants (act B for \business as usual"), shift all generation to gas which
produces less CO
2
emissions (act Gas) at a cost C
g
, or combine either of the
previous acts with R&D into an alternative energy generating technology that
produces no CO
2
emissions at an extra cost C
r
(acts R for \Research" and RG
for \Research and Gas"). Both the outcome of research into the alternative
technology and the eects of CO
2
emissions are supposed uncertain. Let the
relevant events be classied in the table below:
S: Successful Alternative Technology
F: Failure of Alternative Technology
C: No Signicant Eect of CO
2
emissions on Climate
H: Signicant Eect of CO
2
emissions on Climate.
Elementary events (elements of 
) are therefore W=S&C, G=F&C, B=S&H
8
and C=F&H. Scientic knowledge on the likelihood of events is summarized
by F = ff; gg on Y = [0; 1],
C s 2 [0; p
1
f
) C s 2 [0; p
1
g
)
f(s) = B s 2 [p
1
f
; p
2
f
) g(s)= B s 2 [p
1
g
; p
2
g
)
G s 2 [p
2
f
; p
3
f
) G s 2 [p
2
g
; p
3
g
)
W s 2 [p
3
f
; 1] W s 2 [p
3
g
; 1],
with p
j
i
's strictly increasing in j. Finally the acts are dened by the following
outcome table:
W or G B C
Gas  C
g
D
c
 D
g
 C
g
D
c
 D
g
 C
g
R  C
r
D
c
  C
r
 C
r
RG  (C
g
+C
r
) D
c
  (C
g
+C
r
) D
c
 D
g
  (C
g
+ C
r
),
where D
c
and D
g
are the costs of potential damages caused by coal emissions
and gas emissions respectively. Note that the acts are normalized with respect
to the baseline act B, so that the costs of environmental degradation due to
CO
2
emissions from coal plants appear as benets of CO
2
emissions reducing
technologies.
So far, we have not specied the values of the p
i
j
, so that we can make no
statement about the ambiguous nature of the acts dened in the table above.
If all p
j
i
2 (0; 1) are distinct, none of the three acts above is unambiguous.
Suppose now that p
2
f
= p
2
g
, but p
1
f
< p
1
g
. In that case, fB;Cg and fW;Gg are
unambiguous events, so that Gas is an unambiguous act. However, fBg is an
ambiguous event, so that both R and RG are ambiguous acts. In terms of the
historical formulations of the Precautionary Principle, investing in research for
the development of CO
2
free electricity generation methods has a cost which
\cannot be justied by conclusive scientic evidence:" indeed, the expected
utility of R and RG cannot be evaluated.
There emerges therefore from this example a notion of \non-precautionary"
social planner, as one who considers the set of acts as normalized with respect
to a baseline act (in this case, maintaining coal powered generation) and who
is prepared to engage in an alternative act if and only if its expected utility
is positive. Such a social planner would therefore consider the expected utility
of Gas, i.e. (1   p
2
f
)[D
c
  D
g
]   C
g
, and decide to shift to gas if and only if
(1 p
2
f
)[D
c
 D
g
] > C
g
, thereby totally disregarding acts R and RG. It is clear,
however, that even if say (1   p
2
f
)[D
c
  D
g
] = C
g
, so that the social planer is
indierent between B and Gas, there exists reasonable conditions under which
the Choquet expectation of R and RG, with respect to capacity 
F
, is positive.
9
For example, the Choquet expectation of RG is
11
Z
Ch
u(RG(!))
F
(d!) =  (C
g
+ C
r
) + (D
c
 D
g
) (
F
(C [B) + 
F
(B))
=  (C
g
+C
r
) + (D
c
 D
g
)
 
min(p
2
f
; p
2
g
) + min(p
2
f
  p
1
f
; p
2
g
  p
1
g
);

which is positive if and only if
min(p
2
f
; p
2
g
) + min(p
2
f
  p
1
f
; p
2
g
  p
1
g
) >
C
g
+ C
r
D
c
 D
g
;
which, under conditions p
2
f
= p
2
g
, p
1
f
< p
1
g
and (1  p
2
f
)[D
c
 D
g
] = C
g
, becomes
C
r
< [D
c
 D
g
]f3p
2
f
  p
1
g
  1g:
We see, therefore, that under the condition above, for a social planner acting
on behalf of a representative agent with Choquet Expected Utility preferences
(dened precisely in the next section), disregarding act RG leads to a suboptimal
decision. This shows that the Precautionary Principle does not systematically
lead to conservative action, contrary to a largely held belief
12
.
We now give our main denition and state our formalization of the Precau-
tionary Principle as Theorem 1.
Denition 1: Given scientic knowledge F , a utility function on the space
of consequences, and a set of acts , measurable with respect to 
F
and nor-
malized in such a way that and act 
0
, called \Business as Usual" is a null act,
a non precautionary social planner is a Savage Expected Utility Maximizer with
set of acts restricted to 
ua
.
We can now state the main theorem.
Theorem 1: If  is a separable preference relation on acts in  such that
the restriction of  to 
au
is SEU, then non precautionary social planning is
sub optimal.
It is easy to see that the \theorem" trivially follows from the contraction
of the set of possible acts which, in the case of state independent preferences,
unambiguously reduces welfare. As with the Coase Theorem for example, the
problem is not in the proof but in the relevance of the assumptions, which will
be examined in the next section.
11
See, for instance, Cohen and Tallon (2000)
12
For example, Nunn (2001), page 101: \The Precautionary Principle has been dened in
various ways but may be simply seen as the principle of adopting a conservative approach
when the relevant information needed to make an informed decision is limited -the greater the
uncertainty, the more conservative the decision.
10
3 Scientically and subjectively unambiguous events
To examine the scope of the validity of Theorem 1, we need to consider condi-
tions on the representative agent's preference relation under which the condi-
tions of Theorem 1 are satised. To this end, we shall consider two axiomati-
zations of preferences, Choquet Expected Utility (hereafter CEU) and Multiple
Priors (hereafter MEU), and use recent results in Epstein and Zhang (2001) and
Amarante (2001) to show that they both satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1
under mild additional conditions. We shall then be able to summarize this sec-
tion by the following claim: When the representative agent has CEU or MEU
preferences compatible with scientic knowledge F , then Theorem 1 applies, so
that non-precautionary social planning is sub-optimal.
This rests essentially on the identication between scientically unambiguous
events as dened above, and subjectively unambiguous events from the point of
view of a CEU or a MEU preference relation as dened in Epstein and Zhang
(2001). We shall therefore recall the general result of the Ellsberg experiments
which show that an agent presented with objectively ambiguous information on
the state space does not in general transform this information into an additive
probability measure, so that the notion of subjectively unambiguous events is
relevant. We shall then recall the denition of Epstein and Zhang (2001), and
give conditions under which the thus dened subjectively unambiguous events
coincide with scientically unambiguous events as dened above. Corrolary 7.3
part c) of Epstein and Zhang (2001) and corrolary 13 of Amarante (2001) will
then allow us to conclude that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satised.
Elsberg's experiments have shown (in Ellsberg (1961)) that when decision
makers are presented with objectively ambiguous information about the state
space, their preferences are not supported by a single additive subjective prob-
ability over events. The stylized experiment whose results support this claim
is the following. The decision makers are presented with an urn in which they
are told there are 30 red balls and 60 either green or blue. This objective infor-
mation is of ambiguous nature, so that the situation is one of epistemological
indeterminacy as formalized above. The decision makers are asked to choose
between acts 
1
and 
2
on the one hand, and between acts 
3
and 
4
on the
other hand, where all four acts are simple bets dened by the outcome table
below.
R B Green
red is drawn blue is drawn green is drawn

1
bet on R 100 0 0

2
bet on B 0 100 0

3
bet on R or Green 100 0 100

4
bet on B or Green 0 100 100
Preferences uncovered in the experiment are the following: 
1
is in most cases
strictly preferred to 
2
, while 
4
is in most cases strictly preferred to 
3
. Such
11
preferences cannot be supported through expected utility maximization by a
single additive probability measure P over events in the state space, since that
would imply P (R) > P (B) and P (R) + P (Green) < P (B) + P (Green) which
are incompatible. Intuitively, these preferences can be explained by the fact that
some events in the state space are considered as subjectively ambiguous, and
that they are shunned by the decision maker. This yields a distinction between
subjectively ambiguous events (such as fR;Bg in this case) and subjectively
unambiguous events (such as fB;Greeng).
In the example of section 2, we may presume that the representative agent,
informed of \scientic knowledge" on the state space, would also consider fG;Bg
(\Good or Bad," not \Green or Blue"!) as subjectively unambiguous and fCg,
say, as subjectively ambiguous.
Epstein and Zhang (2001) give a subjective denition of unambiguous events
relying purely on the given preference relation . Under their denition, an
event T is unambiguous if for all disjoint sub events A, B of T , acts  and
outcomes y

, y, z, z
0
,
(y

; A; y;B;(!); T   (A [B); z; T
c
)  (y;A; y

; B;(!); T   (A [B); z; T
c
)
implies
(y

; A; y;B;(!); T   (A [B); z
0
; T
c
)  (y;A; y

; B;(!); T   (A [B); z
0
; T
c
);
and the condition above is also satised when T is everywhere replaced by T
c
.
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To investigate the relation between objectively and subjectively unambigu-
ous events, we need to consider separable preference relations which generalize
Savage Expected Utility in the sense that beliefs over the likelihood of events in
the state space are represented by F .
Two main axiomatizations of preferences exist in the literature which satisfy
these criteria: Choquet Expected Utility (hereafter CEU) in Schmeidler (1989)
and  Maxmin Expected Utility (hereafter -MEU) generalized from Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989).
 We call a preference relation  a CEU ordering if there exist a utility
function u : H ! IR and a monotone set function  on a measurable space
(
;),  a -algebra of subsets of 
, such that (
) = 1 and () = 0
and  can be represented by the functional V : ! IR dened by
V () =
Z


u((s))(ds);
where the integral is taken in the sense of Choquet. Axiomatizations of
such preferences in the Savage domain are given in Gilboa (1987) and
Wakker (1989) among others.
13
The notation ((!);A; (!); B) naturally indicates the act equal to (!) for all ! 2 A
and  (!) for all ! 2 B.
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 We call a preference relation an -MEU ordering, if there exists a utility
function u and a unique nonempty, weak

-compact and convex set C of
countably additive probabilities on (
;) as above, such that  can be
represented by the functional
V () =  inf
P2C
Z


u((s))P (ds) + (1  ) sup
P2C
Z


u((s))P (ds);
for  2 [0; 1]. An axiomatization of such preferences in the Savage domain
is given in Casadesus-Masanell, Klibano, and Ozdenoren (2000) (for  =
1).
The two models coincide in case the non additive probability  is a convex
capacity (i.e. (A[B)+(A\B)  (A)+(B) for all A and B in ). In that
case, the CEU preference is identical to an -MEU with  = 1 and C = Core().
The multiple prior principle is often criticized when applied to collective
decision on the grounds that it evaluates acts according to the \worst case sce-
nario," thus emulating the proponents of a total reversal of the burden of proof.
It is clear, rst of all, that this criticism can only apply to the -MEU with
 = 1 (or the special case of CEU with a convex capacity), and, second, that
in our setting, inasmuch as beliefs and outcome sensitivity are separable, and
as beliefs are perfectly extracted and objectively represented by F , consider-
ations of ambiguity aversion are irrelevant to the general formulation of the
Precautionary Principle given above.
In both cases described above, we show that the set A of scientically unam-
biguous events coincides with the set A
0
of EZ-subjectively unambiguous events,
and that preferences are SEU on A, so that Theorem 1 applies.
Theorem 2: If  is CEU with  = 
F
dened in Section 2, and if 
F
satises in addition
(i) 
F
is exact on 
F
, i.e.
inf
f2F
fP
f
(A)g = min
f2F
fP
f
(A)g; all A 2 
F
; (6)
and satises
A \B =  =) (
F
(A [B) = 
F
(B) = 0 =) 
F
(A) ) : (7)
(ii) 
F
is continuous from above on A
0
, i.e. for all decreasing sequence (A
i
)
of subjectively unambiguous events,

F
(\
1
i=1
A
i
) = lim
n!1

F
(A
n
); (8)
(iii) 
F
is convex-ranged on A
0
, i.e. for all A 2 A
0
,
[0; 
F
(A)] = f
F
(B); B 2 A
0
; B  Ag; (9)
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Then the set of scientically unambiguous events coincides with the set of EZ-
subjectively unambiguous events, and  is SEU on 
ua
(so the Theorem 1
applies).
If  is monotone continuous and -MEU with C = fP
f
; f 2 Fg, then the
conclusions above still hold.
Proof of Theorem 2: First of all, recall that, by construction, 
F
is the
lower envelope of a non empty set of additive probabilitymeasures on 
F
. So, as
a Choquet capacity, 
F
is continuous from below along all sets in 
F
. Moreover,
as a lower probability, it satises
A \B =  =) 
F
(A [B)  
F
(A) + 
F
(B); (10)

F
(A) + 
F
(A
c
) = 1; (11)
where 
F
is the conjugate upper probability. From 10, it is easy to see that
A \B =  =) (
F
(A [B) = 
F
(A) =) 
F
(B) = 0 ) : (12)
The conditions of Corrolary 7.3 part c) of Epstein and Zhang (2001) are satis-
ed, which proves the CEU part of the result above. In the -MEU case, the
result follows from Corrolary 13 of Amarante (2001). Note that the assumptions
implicitly impose convexity and weak

-compacity of fP
f
; f 2 Fg.
4 Applications of the precautionary principle
In this section, we want to investigate the nature of scientic knowledge, repre-
sented in the model by functions in F , in actual cases where the Precautionary
Principle is invoked. We will see that the functions f in these cases are science-
based, in a sense that is not in general the traditional one, but is nevertheless
logical and supported by facts. We shall rst consider the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) approach of the perspectives of climate
change. The expected eects of climate change are warmer temperatures, a
more intense and chaotic hydrological cycle, rising sea levels, and possible \sur-
prises" like a weakening of thermohaline circulation (e.g. a weakening of heat
carrying to Europe by the Gulf Stream). In order to estimate these eects, the
IPCC used six greenhouse gases emissions scenarios in various climate models.
The results, as presented in the third IPCC report (2001), are that
 Carbon dioxides concentrations in 2100 would range between 540 and 970
ppm, i.e. between 1.5 and 2.7 times the present level.
 Global average temperatures over the 1990 to 2100 period would increase
by 1.4
o
C to 5.8
o
C.
 Global average sea level would rise by 0.09 to 0.88 meters over this century.
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These changes would be larger than anything experienced in the past 10 000
years, and would be even larger locally (where exactly is still too uncertain to
be mapped). Why such ranges? Because of the uncertainty associated with
such critical parameters as:
 Greenhouse gas emissions (that, for example, have been larger than ex-
pected between 1990 and 2000).
 Impacts of clouds and aerosols (paradoxically, the current emissions of S0
2
and N0
x
are to be regretted in this respect, as the concentrations of these
gases in the atmosphere tend to reduce warming).
 Feedback eects from oceans (as regards both temperatures and storage
of CO
2
).
 Natural climate variability.
No probability measure can be put on the magnitudes of these phenomena,
hence on the ranges of the eects previously mentioned. It is thus clear that the
science of climate change is ambiguous. But the ambiguity is rmly kept within
bounds, that may be seen as bounds on the F-set of scientic knowledge. These
bounds are not provided by the canonical form of scientic investigation as con-
ducted in controlled laboratory conditions, but they are nevertheless the result
of a highly methodical, systematic, and systematically scrutinized production
process, that leaves no room for maverick prophecies. Indeed, the IPCC, as an
international and intergovernmental group of experts, established by the United
Nations and the World Meteorological Organization, is in charge of collecting
relevant scientic data, and of having them produced when they are lacking.
The group uses these data and its members' scientic expertise (in physics,
chemistry, biology, economics, etc.) to asses the physico-chemical, ecological,
and socio-economic consequences of climate change. The experts in the group
are chosen by their scientic peers, and the choice is conrmed by their respec-
tive governments. Their work is organized as a continuous process, in subgroups
gathered by eld of investigation. They produce interim reports that are dis-
cussed with governments and NGOs. But they retain sole responsibility for the
contents of their periodic ocial reports (1990, 1995, 2001). By contrast, the
executive summary of each ocial report is examined line by line with repre-
sentatives of governments. All this shows that the IPCC process contributes to
the F-set of scientic knowledge in a systematically organized, controlled and
rigorous way. It is all the more remarkable that the US government rejects this
contribution as scientically unfounded.
We shall now more briey consider the beef meat conict between the USA
and the EU before the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the ways the
investigation processes in the possible dangers of chemical products accept or
reject the precautionary principle.
The decision by the EU to block the imports of American beef - because,
in raising beef, American farmers use various hormones that are forbidden in
15
Europe - has been challenged before the WTO as a trade impediment devoid of
scientic justication.
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The case has been decided according to the rules of the WTO Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPM). These rules
are traditional in terms of what constitutes an acceptable proof of a sanitary
danger (laboratory experiments according to standard protocols, epidemiolog-
ical studies, bias towards avoiding Type I errors, i.e. accepting the existence
of a danger when there is none, rather than Type II errors, i.e. rejecting the
existence of a danger when there is one, etc.). The European representatives
were unable to meet such requirements and their reference to the Precautionary
Principle was rejected; accordingly, they lost the case.
However, it is interesting to observe in the minutes of the case, as did Noiville
(2000), that the WTO Appellate Body in charge didn't rigidly adhere to the
SPM spirit, and hinted that the actual cause of the rebuttal of the European de-
fence was not a rejection of the Precautionary Principle per se, but of the insu-
cient and poorly organized evidence provided, that didn't permit to legitimately
invoke the Precautionary Principle. Indeed the European defence concentrated
on rather doubtful carcinogen eects and ignored more compelling factors, like
immunological and neurobiological ones, favouring obesity for example.
As far as chemical products sold on the American market are concerned,
their dealing with respect to the precautionary principle is contradictory, both in
regulatory and judicial arenas. As recollected by Cranor (1999), \the regulation
on carcinogens, for example, is in large part by means of post-market regulatory
laws [...]. In a few cases, premarket regulatory statutes also address carcinogens
(aspects of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act-notably the Delaney clause - the
Toxic Substance Control Act, and aspects of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act). Where the regulation of toxic substances is by means
of post-market regulatory statutes, standards of proof reinforce the scientic
burdens" put on the victims
15
.
The rulings of Courts are no less contrasted in their interpretation of what
constitutes a scientic proof and what is the relevance of the precautionary prin-
ciple. For example, while the Washington DC Circuit ruled, as early as 1976,
that \The statutes - and common sense - demand regulatory action to prevent
harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that the harm is otherwise in-
evitable [...] awaiting certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive,
regulation" (Ethyl Corp. v. EPA), the Supreme Court, in 1993, ruled that \In
order to qualify as `scientic knowledge', an inference or assertion must be de-
rived by a scientic method. Proposed expert testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation -i.e., good grounds based on what is known" (Daubert
14
On EC measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones), see Maruyama (1998)
and Wilson and Gascoine (2001).
15
For a detailed list of \post-market" (i.e. the product goes to the market without any
legal requirement of testing its dangerousness; after the manifestation of a danger or the
realization of a damage, proof must be delivered according to traditional scientic criteria)
and \pre-market" (i.e. the product must be tested before going to the market) regulations,
see Congress (1987).
16
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.)
16
.
The 1993 judgement was conrmed and reinforced in 1997 by General Elec-
tric v. Joiner. Obviously, what constitutes scientic proof, in cases where public
health issues are at stake, needs clarication, all the more as \toxicology is not
an exact science and there can be disagreements over data interpretation among
toxicologists" in the words of one of them
17
. The Precautionary Principle, prop-
erly formulated and rigorously implemented, may provide such clarication, as
suggested from a medical point of view by Graham (2001): \Waiting for scien-
tic certainty of harm prior to taking protective action is a prescription for new
epidemics as well as continued declines in public trust in government, industry
and technology".
5 Conclusion
The precautionary principle is about the nature of scientic deduction and in-
ference which is appropriate in choices under Knightian uncertainty (or ambi-
guity). It is not about \cost-eective" choices, that are anyway required by the
principle of Paretian eciency. Nor is it about \cost-benet analysis" or \pro-
portionality", that are embedded in the optimal choice of an act in the set 
of possible acts with respect to the preference ordering  of the representative
agent. Trivially, it is all the more necessary to correctly apply the precautionary
principle as the issues at stake are more \serious" and more \irreversible". But
irreversibility, or VOI (Value of information) as the risk managers say (see Gra-
ham 2001) is a dynamic concept, that requires a dynamic version of our model.
This is left for future research, as is the issue of who bears the burden of the
proof, which is meaningless here and would require a game-theoretic setting.
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